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Abstract
Dana (2001) developed a model of price dispersion under demand uncertainty. The
model predicts that, in the face of uncertain demand and in
exible prices, monopolists
maximizes prots using ex ante price discrimination. We test the predictions of this
model using a unique data set from Major League Baseball (MLB). Estimation of a
two-way xed eects model indicate that ticket price dispersion changes systematically
with demand uncertainty in MLB, verifying the predictions of the model.
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1 Motivation
Price dispersion exists for many reasons. Stigler (1961) identied three sources of price
dispersion: costs to determining the prices of rival producers, instability in supply and
demand, and knowledge obsolescence from entry and exit of buyers and sellers. Dana (2001)
developed a model of price dispersion under monopoly where a monopolist faces uncertain
demand and must set prices in advance of sales. Dana's (2001) model predicts that prots
increase when the monopolist oers multiple prices, so long as the ex post monopoly price
increases when demand increases. The intuition in this model is that dierent demand states
have dierent price elasticities, and the monopolist exploits these in the face of uncertainty
about demand by oering the same or similar goods at dierent prices.
Major League Baseball (MLB) teams are monopolists, or duopolists in the case of the
four metropolitan areas with two MLB teams, and set ticket prices in advance. Ticket sales
represent the largest source of revenues for MLB teams. Dana's (2001) model applies directly
to MLB; ticket price setting in sports motivated the model.
Price dispersion can also result from a rm's attempt to capture consumer surplus. Salop
and Stiglitz (1982) concluded that when entry costs exist, \the only possible equilibria in
the market involve price dispersion" (p. 1121). Changes in competition in a market also may
generate price dispersion. Dana (1999) developed a model of price dispersion and market
structure that predicts price dispersion increases as the market becomes more competitive.
Stahl (1989) developed a model of price dispersion and market structure that predicts price
dispersion decreases as the market becomes more competitive. The dierence between these
two models is that Dana (1999) assumes that uncertain demand and price setting before
demand is known leads to price dispersion while Stahl (1989) assumes that costly consumer
search and information asymmetries leads to price dispersion.
Not all of the observed dierences in ticket prices at professional sporting events represent
price dispersion. Each seat in baseball stadium provides the spectator with a dierent view,
and a dierent experience. There are important quality dierences between seats, and some3
observed price dierences can be attributed to the heterogeneity. Dierential pricing based
on dierences in quality can be found in sports, theater, concerts, and other markets (Courty,
2003). However, at some level all spectators attending a baseball game consume the same
good, the game played on the eld. Dana's (2001) model explains how observed price
dispersion in MLB can be interpreted as a monopolist charging dierent prices for similar
goods in the face of uncertain demand. Fort (2004) summarizes the existing literature on
price setting in professional sports.
We analyze ticket price dispersion in Major League Baseball (MLB) using a unique data
set. MLB produces two annual publications, the Red Book for the American League and the
Green Book for the National League. These publications contain a wealth of data, including
player statistics, the location of team hotels in various cities, club front oce personnel
contact information, and other facts. These publications also contain a list of all ticket
prices set by each club in advance of the season. The price data from these publications
provides detailed information about team pricing decisions, and price dispersion, over a long
period of time, giving us a unique setting in which to analyze monopoly price dispersion.
MLB operates as a legal monopoly, variation in on-eld performance gives us an measure
of demand uncertainty, and the total number of tickets sold, a good measure of output, is
known.1
2 Data
We obtained detailed ticket price data from the Red Book and Green Book for the 1975
through 2007 seasons. The Red and Green books contain ticket prices for each section in
each stadium. In 2008 MLB made the Red and Green books available only as PDFs. In
2009 and 2010, MLB denied us access to the PDFs. The sample contains 994 team-season
observations. Table 1 contains summary statistics on number of distinct prices oered,
1No publicly available data exist on the number of tickets sold at each price point listed in the Red and
Green books.4
dened as the number of dierent ticket prices listed, including general admission tickets.
The minimum and maximum ticket prices are in 2008 US Dollars, de
ated by the CPI. We
omit data for the Montreal and Toronto because of a lack of data for Canadian cities before
1987.
Table 1: Ticket Price Summary Statistics, 1975-2008
Average # Largest # Smallest #
Team Name of Prices Oered Oered Avg P Min P Max P Median P StDev P
Arizona 13.55 15 8 37.46 1.07 215.00 23.40 32.22
Atlanta 5.82 10 4 16.92 1.04 70.00 15.59 9.52
Baltimore 7.97 13 4 18.25 3.22 80.00 13.81 8.09
Boston 5.91 7 4 25.18 4.46 125.00 20.85 12.29
California 6.71 12 3 16.71 4.79 150.00 11.96 8.76
Chicago Cubs 5.79 10 4 17.77 4.45 58.15 14.08 7.06
Chicago White Sox 5.38 8 3 18.06 5.93 51.92 16.29 6.34
Cincinnati 6.29 11 4 15.62 3.96 77.88 13.05 7.11
Cleveland 6.06 12 4 16.22 3.30 66.15 11.78 8.88
Colorado 12.25 15 8 17.21 1.22 48.80 13.39 11.18
Detroit 5.62 11 4 17.10 5.00 93.77 13.73 9.62
Florida 7.69 10 4 24.50 2.50 103.84 20.85 15.50
Houston 7.38 12 5 16.35 1.04 52.00 13.61 8.19
Kansas City 5.76 9 4 16.36 3.35 167.55 15.01 8.62
Los Angeles 4.97 13 3 16.72 4.00 207.68 11.74 8.28
Milwaukee 7.59 11 5 17.25 1.07 88.26 15.53 8.44
Minnesota 5.03 9 2 16.08 4.74 106.00 15.22 7.73
New York Mets 4.38 6 3 20.01 3.92 74.76 17.05 8.04
New York Yankees 5.94 14 3 28.05 3.00 415.36 18.27 16.96
Oakland 5.65 9 4 20.08 4.32 213.59 16.19 14.78
Philadelphia 4.94 9 4 16.22 4.46 50.00 14.36 5.84
Pittsburgh 5.71 12 3 15.25 4.74 54.00 13.06 6.41
San Diego 6.26 12 3 15.38 5.00 62.69 13.11 6.97
San Francisco 6.32 13 4 19.10 2.37 95.00 15.00 9.56
Seattle 5.94 12 4 17.98 3.11 62.69 13.66 8.86
St. Louis 6.24 13 4 17.99 4.79 88.26 11.69 8.34
Tampa 9.91 11 9 52.36 1.94 257.57 29.25 61.82
Texas 6.76 13 4 18.07 2.39 88.19 14.81 9.34
Table 1 reveals signicant variation in price setting behavior. The maximum number
of ticket price points oered by teams is more than ten, suggesting that price dispersion is
high league wide. The table reveals considerable dispersion in the minimum and maximum
ticket prices oered, with some teams oering maximum prices four times higher than other
teams. Table 1 shows large variation in within-team price dispersion. The standard deviation
of ticket prices oered by Tampa (61.82) is more than 10 times that of Philadelphia (5.84).
Most teams oer a skewed distribution of prices, as the average ticket price is higher than
the median. Recent expansion teams oer tickets at more price points than older franchises.5
Table 2 contains summary statistics for on-eld performance, market, and stadium char-
acteristics. Table 2 shows quite a bit of variation in market size, stadium size, and on-led
performance in the sample. The market size variable exhibits considerable variation even
when accounting for the fact that the four largest markets have two teams.
Table 2: Team Performance and Market Sample Means
Team Name Years Capacity Population Std. Dev. Win %
Arizona 11 48,989 3,648,595 0.101
Atlanta 34 51,613 3,436,008 0.050
Baltimore 33 50,667 2,419,758 0.049
Boston 34 34,176 4,195,981 0.039
California 34 53,940 11,167,046 0.052
Chicago Cubs 34 38,618 8,564,970 0.054
Chicago White Sox 34 44,344 8,564,970 0.052
Cincinnati 34 49,951 1,899,599 0.055
Cleveland 34 61,152 2,144,724 0.055
Colorado 16 53,572 2,171,183 0.036
Detroit 34 49,005 4,357,631 0.064
Florida 16 40,237 5,023,931 0.058
Houston 34 46,737 4,080,806 0.048
Kansas City 34 40,600 1,697,239 0.046
Los Angeles 34 56,000 11,167,046 0.046
Milwaukee 34 50,582 1,454,159 0.047
Minnesota 34 51,110 2,628,857 0.048
New York Mets 34 55,917 17,436,310 0.057
New York Yankees 34 57,355 17,436,310 0.046
Oakland 34 46,394 3,734,664 0.063
Philadelphia 34 59,829 5,514,464 0.046
Pittsburgh 34 49,445 2,505,991 0.049
San Diego 34 53,806 2,427,989 0.056
San Francisco 34 54,578 3,734,664 0.055
Seattle 32 55,802 2,665,462 0.054
St. Louis 34 51,476 2,619,958 0.051
Tampa 11 43,311 2,536,503 0.031
Texas 34 44,864 4,281,016 0.052
3 Empirical Analysis and Discussion
We estimate a reduced form linear regression model of the price dispersion chosen by each
team
PDit = 1i + 2tyeart + 1DUit + 2Mit + it (1)
where PDit is the standard deviation of ticket prices set by MLB team i in season t, 1i6
a team xed eect, yeart a vector of indicator variables for each year in the sample, DUit
a measure of demand uncertainty, Mit a vector of variables re
ecting market and stadium
conditions, and 2t, 1, and 2 unknown parameters to be estimated. The equation error
term 1it captures all other factors that aect price dispersion and it  (0;2
). Equation
(1) is a two way xed eects model. We estimate the unknown parameters of equation (1)
using OLS.
We proxy demand uncertainty with the variation in each teams' winning percentage over
the past 5 seasons. Winning percentage re
ects team quality, a factor that aects demand
for tickets. The more variable past winning percentage, the more uncertain the team will
be about current demand for tickets. Mit contains variables controlling for other factors
aecting price dispersion, including the number of competitors in the market, and stadium
characteristics that aect quality dierences across seats in each stadium. The team xed-
eect also controls for stadium-specic seat quality dierences, like sightlines and distance
from the upper deck to the eld, as these factors do not change over time in a given stadium.
Table 3 contains the parameter estimates and p-values for Equation (1). The xed eects
parameter estimates are not reported, although they are generally signicant. The model
explains 61% of the observed variation in price dispersion in MLB. Correcting the standard
errors for heteroscedasticity using the standard White-Huber \sandwich" method had no
eect on the results.
Competition in the local market, in the form of another MLB team, but not other profes-
sional sports teams, leads to lower price dispersion, consistent with the predictions of Stahl's
(1989) model. Larger markets are associated with more price dispersion, probably because
larger markets have more fans and more variation in elasticity of demand, providing an in-
centive to oer tickets at more prices. Stadium characteristics, in terms of capacity, have no
eect on price dispersion. Teams playing in older stadiums have greater price dispersion, be-
cause older stadiums lack modern prot-enhancing amenities like wide concourses, premium
concessions, and conveniently located team shops.7
Table 3: Regression Results - Parameter Estimates and P-Values
Variable Coecient Std. Error p-value
Standard Deviation of Winning %, last 5 seasons -27.51 13.481 0.04
MSA Population (000) 0.002 0.001 0.01
Stadium Age 0.046 0.020 0.02
Stadium Capacity (000) -0.018 0.056 0.75
MLB Franchise -19.25 3.016 <0.001
NBA Franchise -1.884 1.439 0.19
NFL Franchise 0.729 0.795 0.36
NHL Franchise 0.334 1.143 0.77
R2 0.61 N 857
The parameter of interest is on the standard deviation of each team's winning percentage
over the last ve season, a proxy for uncertainty of demand. Teams with more past variation
in on-eld success will have more demand variability. The estimated parameter on this vari-
able is negative, and statistically signicant. Dana's (2001) model predicts that monopolists
facing uncertain demand and setting prices before knowing the actual state of demand in-
crease prots by oering multiple prices, but the model does not generate a prediction about
the exact relationship between demand uncertainty and the number of prices oered. The
model predicts that the larger the ex post monopoly price { the sport price the monopolist
would set at diering levels of demand { the larger the variation in ex ante prices oered,
and links this dierence to the elasticity of demand at dierent demand states. The negative
sign on this parameter is consistent with a relatively small, but positive elasticity of demand
across dierent demand states, in the context of the model developed by Dana (2001). This
sign is also consistent with the idea that teams with relatively little variation in demand
have to oer tickets at a wider variety of prices to exploit dierences in demand elasticity.
This sign is also consistent with the idea that teams with larger variation in demand are
able to learn more about their customers from this variation, and can oer tickets at fewer
price points to exploit dierences in demand elasticity.
The results conrm the predictions made in the monopoly price dispersion model devel-8
oped by Dana (2001), and indicate that this model explains observed price dispersion even
when other factors that aect price dispersion are controlled for. Price discrimination, and
variable quality of seats, are not the only reason that monopoly MLB teams charge dierent
prices for tickets. Uncertain demand also explains observed price dispersion in MLB. The
results also suggest that additional modeling work should be done in this area. Dana's (2001)
model does not make specic predictions about the sign of the relationship between price
dispersion and demand uncertainty, but the results indicate a negative relationship. Since
the model identies the elasticity of demand for dierent realized demands levels as the key
factor, additional modeling should proceed in this direction.
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